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United States District Court, District of Kansas
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Robert Dole, Plaintiff v.
Jimmy Carter, President of the United States,, Defendant
(December 30, 1977)
Memorandum and Order
This case, a declaratory judgment action seeking to enjoin the President of
the United States from returning to the People's Republic of Hungary the
Hungarian coronation regalia, is now before the court for determination of
the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction .... In view of the urgent
circumstances surrounding the litigation and adjudication of the claims ad-
vanced herein, the court has had little opportunity to prepare an extensive
opinion expounding upon the vast array of constitutional, political, and legal
issues in this case. Nevertheless, after scrutinizing the relevant law in light of
the facts developed in the record before us, the court is convinced that the
plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction must be denied.
The salient facts in this case, briefly summarized, are as follows: In approx-
imately 1000 A.D., Pope Sylvester II donated to Stephen, then Duke of
Hungary, a crown establishing Stephen as the first King of Hungary and
declaring Hungary a state in the international system of Europe. This crown,
which became known as the Holy Crown of St. Stephen or the Holy Crown of
Hungary, thereafter assumed extraordinary historical importance to the peo-
ple of Hungary, symbolizing both the constitutional monarchy of Hungary
and the freedom of religion from governmental interference in Hungary. The
Holy Crown apparently remained in Hungarian custody from 1000 A.D. until
July 25, 1945, shortly after the surrender of all German forces in Europe at the
conclusion of World War II but prior to the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty
of February 10, 1947, ending the state of war between the Allied Powers and
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Hungary. At that time the Hungarian Commander of the Crown Guards en-
trusted to the United States for safekeeping the Holy Crown and other corona-
tion regalia including the Coronation Robe, Orb, Sceptre and Sword. To date,
the United States has secured said regalia in an undisclosed location with a
view to its eventual return to the people of Hungary.
On December 1.5, 1977, the United States and Hungarian governments joint-
ly announced that the President of the United States had determined it "ap-
propriate and fitting" that the Hungarian coronation regalia be returned to
the people of Hungary at ceremonies on January 6 and 7, 1978, and that it be
thereafter placed on permanent public display in an appropriate historical
location in Budapest for "the population of the country, Hungarians living
abroad, and foreigners alike to see." This communique resulted from an ex-
change of diplomatic letters on December 13, 1977, outlining various
agreements of the United States and Hungary as to the conditions under which
the coronation regalia was to be returned, the nature of the attendant
ceremonies, and ceremonial objectives of emphasizing "traditional United
States-Hungarian ties, friendship between our two peoples, and our mutual
desire to continue the development of better bilateral relations." Announce-
ment of the proposed return of the Holy Crown generated not inconsiderable
public controversy in various sectors, including groups of Hungarian nationals
in the United States and elsewhere, members of the Roman Catholic Church,
and certain members of the United States Senate and House of Represen-
tatives.
On December 23, 1977, Robert Dole, a United States Senator from the State
of Kansas, filed the instant action seeking to enjoin delivery of the Holy
Crown and coronation regalia to the People's Republic of Hungary on the
ground that such action, undertaken by the President without the prior advice
and consent of the United States Senate, constitutes a violation of Article II,
Section 2, of the Constitution of the United States. That constitutional provi-
sion, in relevant part, confers upon the President the power, "by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of
the Senators present concur." The plaintiff's argument is premised upon his
factual assertion that the subject of custody of the Holy Crown was by tacit
agreement of the American and Hungarian authorities deliberately omitted
from the text of the Paris Peace Treaty of February 10, 1947, in order to pre-
vent the Soviet Union-a co-signer of the Treaty, then occupying
Hungary-from asserting any claim of right to possession thereof. According
to the plaintiff, the American and Hungarian authorities not only agreed that
the Paris Peace Treaty would be silent on this subject; they also tacitly agreed
that (1) the United States would retain custody of the coronation regalia until
such time as Soviet troops were withdrawn from Hungary in accord with Arti-
cle 22 of the Paris Peace Treaty; and (2) return of the regalia would be effec-
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tuated only after negotiation of an appropriate treaty between the United
States and a legitimate Hungarian government at some future date. The plain-
tiff contends that this "silent agreement" is an integral part of the Paris Peace
Treaty of 1947 that cannot be varied or modified without the making of
another formal treaty ratified by the Senate. In the alternative, he claims that
any agreement to return the coronation regalia to Hungary in and of itself con-
stitutes a new bilateral treaty for which the President must seek Senate ap-
proval. Therefore, the President's unilateral undertaking to return said
regalia, evidenced by the December 13, 1977, exchange of letters, is said to be
ultra vires and beyond the scope of his lawful constitutional authority.
In assessing the merits of the plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief, the
court commences with the fundamental rule of law that a preliminary injunc-
tion is an "extraordinary remedy" that should be granted only upon a proper
showing. The burden is clearly upon one requesting such relief to make a
"prima facie case showing a reasonable probability" that he will ultimately
prevail on the merits of his claim. E.g., Penn v. San Juan Hospital, Inc., 528
F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1975); Continental Oil Company v. Frontier Refining
Company, 338 F.2d 780 (10th Cir. 1964). In addition, the applicant has the
burden of showing that "irreparable injury" will result if the requested injunc-
tion is not granted. E.g., Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp.,
426 F.2d 569 (10th Cir. 1970); Crowther v. Seaborg, 415 F.2d 437 (10th Cir.
1969).
In determining whether the plaintiff here has established a reasonable prob-
ability of success on the merits of his claim, the court must confront the two
crucial issues in this case: (1) whether the alleged "tacit agreement" is such an
integral part of the Paris Peace Treaty that it can be modified only by enact-
ment of a formal treaty approved by a two-thirds vote of the Senate; and (2)
whether the President's agreement to return the Hungarian coronation regalia
constitutes a treaty obligation that must be ratified by the Senate.
The first issue must be resolved contrary to the plaintiff's argument. The
only evidence he produces in support thereof consists of affidavits by in-
dividuals who allegedly are familiar with the circumstances under which the
coronation regalia was turned over to American authorities. No affidavits
have been provided from individuals who were involved in the actual treaty
negotiation process. Defendant, however, has provided us with the affidavit of
Mark B. Feldman, Deputy Legal Advisor of the Department of State. Mr.
Feldman states that after having searched all relevant files he "has not
discovered any indication of any understanding between United States and
Hungarian authorities concerning the application or nonapplication of the
1947 Treaty of Peace to the Crown of St. Stephen, tacit or otherwise." The
record is void of anything indicating that Hungarian officials who approved
the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, President Truman, and United States Senators
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who voted in favor of ratification of the treaty, were aware of and understood
the "silent agreement by tacit omission." The court is not impressed with
plaintiff's contention that this alleged "silent agreement" can rise to the level
of a formal treaty which can only be modified by another formal treaty
ratified* by the Senate.
We turn now to the plaintiff's argument that the agreement to return the
coronation regalia to Hungary in and of itself constitutes a treaty which must
be ratified* by the Senate. It is well established, and even plaintiff admits, that
the United States frequently enters into international agreements other than
treaties. Indeed, as of January 1, 1972, the United States was a party to 5,306
international agreements, only 947 of which were treaties and 4,359 of which
were international agreements other than treaties. See J. Murphy, Treaties and
International Agreements, 23 KAN. L. REV. 221, 223 n.15 (1975).' These
"other agreements" appear to fall into three categories: (1) so-called
Congressional-Executive agreements, executed by the President upon specific
authorizing legislation from the Congress; (2) executive agreements pursuant
to treaty, executed by the President in accord with specific instructions found
in a prior, formal treaty; and (3) executive agreements executed pursuant to
the President's own constitutional authority (hereinafter referred to as "ex-
ecutive agreements"). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 119-21 (1965). Defendant contends that his
agreement to return the coronation regalia to Hungary falls into the latter
category, and the court agrees.
Section 121 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES reads as follows:
§ 121: Scope of Executive Agreement Pursuant to
President's Constitutional Authority.
An international agreement made by the United States as an executive agreement
without reference to a treaty or act of Congress may, subject to the limitations in-
dicated in § 117, deal with any matter that under the Constitution falls within the in-
dependent powers of the President.
Specific constitutional grants of power to the President are scattered
throughout Article II. The "executive Power" is vested in the President (Arti-
cle II, Section 1) and this provision has traditionally been cited as the authority
for the President to conduct the foreign relations of the United States. See
*EDITOR'S NOTE: Judge O'Connor's language is unfortunate. The Senate does not ratify
treaties; it gives its advice and consent to ratification, which is an executive act embodied in the in-
st'ument of ratification and signed by the President.
'Citing statement of John R. Stevenson, Legal Advisor, Department of State, in Subcommittee
on Separation of Powers, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Ninety-Second Congress, Second
Session, Hearings on Congressional Oversight of Executive Agreements 249 (Commercial Print,
1972).
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Comment to Section 121 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra. The Presi-
dent is also the "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy" (Article II, Sec-
tion 2); is empowered to make treaties, and to nominate and appoint am-
bassadors and other public ministers and consuls, with the "Advice and Con-
sent of the Senate" (Article II, Section 2); and is also given the obligation to
see that the "Laws be faithfully executed" (Article II, Section 3).
The Supreme Court has long ago recognized that the President has the
"power to make such international agreements as do not constitute treaties in
the constitutional sense." 2 United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp., 304
U.S. 299, 318 (1936), citing Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583,
600-601 (1912). This power, although not "expressly affirmed by the Constitu-
tion," nevertheless exists as inherently inseparable from the conception of
nationality." The justifications for the power are found "not in the provisions
of the Constitution, but in the law of nations." Curtiss-Wright, 304 U.S. at
318.
Since the Curtiss-Wright decision, the Supreme Court has twice upheld the
validity of an executive agreement made by President Franklin Roosevelt with
the Soviet Union. In the Litvinov Agreement, the President recognized and
established diplomatic relations with that nation. In addition, for the purpose
of bringing.about a final settlement of claims and counterclaims between the
Soviet Union and the United States, it was agreed that the Soviet Union would
take no steps to enforce claims against American nationals, but all such claims
were assigned to the United States with the understanding that the Soviet
Union would be notified of all amounts realized by the United States. In
speaking for the Court in United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937),
Justice Sutherland, who also authored the majority opinion in Curtiss-Wright,
supra, stated:
[A]n international compact, as this was, is not always a treaty which requires the par-
ticipation of the Senate. There are many such compacts, of which a protocol, a
modus vivendi, a postal convention, and agreements like that now under considera-
tion are illustrations. 301 U.S. at 330-31.
Justice Sutherland further expounded upon the nature of executive
agreements in United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942):
Recognition is not always absolute; it is sometimes conditional .... Power to
remove such obstacles to full recognition as settlement of claims of our na-
tionals ... certainly is a modest implied power of the President who is the "sole
organ of the federal government in the field of international relations." . . . Effec-
tiveness in handling the delicate problems of foreign relations requires no less. Unless
such a power exists, the power of recognition might be thwarted or seriously diluted.
'Treaties are mentioned in three constitutional provisions other than Article II, Section 2. None
of these provisions make any attempt at definition. U.S. CONST., Art. 1, § 10; Art. Ill, § 2; Art.
VI.
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No such obstacle can be placed in the way of rehabilitation of relations between this
country and another nation, unless the historic conception of the powers and respon-
sibilities of the President in the conduct of foreign affairs . . . is to be drastically
revised. 315 U.S. at 229-230 (citations omitted).
The problem of what the President may or may not do without formal
Senate consent is one of line-drawing. As one prominent author has put it,
"One is compelled to conclude that there are arrangements which the Presi-
dent can make on his sole authority and others which he can make only with
the consent of the Senate, but neither Justice Sutherland nor anyone else has
told us which are which." L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITU-
TION, p.179 (The Foundation Press, 1972). We need not attempt to reach the
constitutional perimeters of this problem, however, for we are of the opinion
that the transaction which gave rise to this lawsuit has the indicia of an ex-
ecutive agreement.
The court attaches considerable weight to the quoted language from the
Pink case. It is true that the United States does, at this time, formally
"recognize" the Hungarian government. However, as counsel discussed at
oral argument, relations between the United States and Hungary, as well as
other Eastern European countries, have not been "normalized" since the end
of World War II. The United States' continued dominion over the Hungarian
coronation regalia, in which this country claims no property interest, can
reasonably be viewed as a serious "obstacle" which may impede the
"rehabilitation of relations" between the United States and Hungary. The
decision to remove such an obstacle appears to be well within the traditional
powers of the President.'
As noted above, neither the Constitution nor the relevant case law offers
significant legal guidance as to which kinds of international agreements must
be concluded in "treaty" form subject to the advice and consent of the Senate,
and which kinds of agreements may be concluded on the independent ex-
ecutive authority of the President in the area of foreign affairs. However, the
court's review of authorities on the subject of treaties indicates that by com-
mon practice from the beginning of the Republic, treaties have customarily ex-
hibited such fundamental characteristics as substantial ongoing defense or
political commitments on the part of the United States and substantial ongoing
reciprocal commitments by co-signers. The very substantiality of the bilateral
commitments traditionally embodied in treaties underlies the Article 11, Sec-
tion 2, requirement of senatorial consent and, in addition, occasions the for-
mality and deliberation with which treaties are generally negotiated and ex-
'indeed, as noted earlier, the government has indicated that a prime purpose of the return of the
coronation regalia and the attendant ceremony is to aid the "development of better bilateral rela-
tions" between the two countries.
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ecuted. It appears that these characteristics are often lacking in the case of ex-
ecutive agreements. While such agreements are recognized as having the same
effect as treaties in international law, they may involve such relatively minor
subjects as the "administrative working details for carrying out a treaty or
agreement" or be "in the nature of commercial contracts relating to sales of
equipment and commodities." 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADM. NEWS, p.
3069. The United States enters into approximately 200 executive agreements
each year, Id. at 3068, and it has been observed that the constitutional system
"could not last a month" if the President sought Senate or congressional con-
sent for every one of them. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITU-
TION, supra, at 182. Congress itself recognized this fact in passing P.L. 92-403,
1 U.S.C. § 112b, requiring the Secretary of State to transmit for merely infor-
mational purposes the text of all international agreements other than treaties
to which the United States becomes a party. The House Committee on Foreign
Affairs stated in recommending passage of that statute that while it wished to
be apprised of "all agreements of any significance," "[c]learly the Congress
does not want to be inundated with trivia." 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADM.
NEWS, p. 3069.
While the President's undertaking to return the Hungarian coronation
regalia is hardly a "trivial" matter to either the United States or the people of
Hungary, the court is yet convinced that the President's agreement in this
regard lacks the magnitude of agreements customarily concluded in treaty
form. The President's agreement here involves no substantial ongoing com-
mitment on the part of the United States, exposes the United States to no ap-
preciable discernible risks, and contemplates American action of an extremely
limited duration in time. The plaintiff presented no evidence that agreements
of the kind in question here are traditionally concluded only by treaty, either
as a matter of American custom or as a matter of international law. Indeed,
while the court has not exhaustively examined all possibly pertinent treaties,
the court can hardly imagine that any such examination would lend support to
the plaintiff's position. Finally, the agreement here encompasses no substan-
tial reciprocal commitments by the Hungarian government. As a matter of
law, the court is therefore persuaded that the President's agreement to return
the Hungarian coronation regalia is not a commitment requiring the advice
and consent of the Senate under Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the court must conclude that the plaintiff
has demonstrated no reasonable probability of ultimate success on the merits
of his claim. This finding necessarily requires the court to deny the plaintiff's
application for preliminary injunctive relief.
In rendering a decision grounded solely on the preliminary injunction ques-
tion, we have assumed without deciding that plaintiff has standing to bring
this action and that the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter. Deter-
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mination of those matters, together with the defendant's motions to dismiss
or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, will be necessary only if the case
proceeds beyond the preliminary injunction stage. The court has also con-
sidered plaintiff's "Motion in Camera" and the same is denied.
At the time this case was submitted, counsel for each side requested the
court to stay any order granting or denying a preliminary injunction pending
appeal of such order by the non-prevailing party. For the reasons expressed
herein, plaintiff's motion for stay under Rule 62(c), Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, is denied.
The clerk is directed to enter the attached Journal Entry of Judgment deny-
ing a preliminary injunction.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 30th day of December, 1977, at Kansas City, Kansas.
EARL E. O'CONNOR
United States District Judge
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